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COMMENT
IN BANC PROCEDURES IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEAIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Comment will examine various aspects of current in banc procedures
in the United States courts of appeals.' Normally the courts of appeals sit in
panels of three judges. 2 Each such panel, or division, of the court is
considered to be the court of appeals and its decisions carry the full weight of
the court. 3 However, a court of appeals has the power to sit in banc, 4 which
means it may sit as a court comprised of all the circuit court judges in active
the initial
service within the circuit. 5 This procedure may be utilized on
6
hearing of the case or for the rehearing of a panel decision.
Several factors have combined in recent years to increase the importance of
in banc procedure. There has been a substantial increase in the number of8
appeals filed. 7 This increase in caseload has led to an increase in judgeships
and a need for even more. 9 In addition, there has been a steady increase in
the intercircuit assignment of judges. 10 These facts decrease the control
exercised by the majority of active judges over panel decisions. The result
may be failure to establish uniformity of decision within the court and
1. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1970); Fed. R. App. P. 35. Although the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure were not in effect until 1968, the rule controlling in banc proceedings, rule 35, is
essentially a codification of prior case law. See Western Pac. R. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. R,
345 U.S. 247 (1953); Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). Since rule 35
uses "in" rather than "en," "in banc" will be used throughout this comment. A most comprehensive work on the subject is Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals
Ac-^ommodating Institutional Responsibilities (pts. I & II), 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 563 & 726 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities).
2. Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970); see Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac.
R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 254 (1953).
3. Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970); Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 333
(1941); Fed. R. App. P. 35.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970); Fed. R. App. P. 35.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970); Fed. R. App. P. 35.
7. In 1973, 15,629 appeals were filed. This is an increase of 301% over the figure for 1960Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical Boundaries of
the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change 1 (1973); -ee 1973 Director of the
Admin. Office of the United States Courts Ann. Rep. 89 [hereinafter cited as 1973 Ann. Rep.].
8. 1970 Ann. Rep. 86-87.
9. Id. at 13.
10. Cf. id. at 26.
11. Cf. Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 Wis.
L. Rev. 461; Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1965-1971: A Quantitative
Analysis, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 635 (1973). But cf. Friendly, Of Voting Blocs, and Cabbages and
Kings, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 673 (1973).
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consequent frustration of the expectations of a party due to the particular
composition of a panel. 2
Some method is needed for the majority of active judges to maintain
control over the panels. 3 Use of the in banc procedure can accomplish this,
allowing the majority of the court to exercise control over issues which are
important to or often litigated in the circuit.
But questions about the effectiveness of in banc proceedings in achieving
uniformity of justice remain. Can litigants rely on in banc review where there
is conflict among panels? Do the provisions of the rule regulating in banc
procedure provide tools for predicting? This leads to related questions. Should
the provisions of the rule be amended or revised? Can problems that are
central or ancillary to in banc proceedings be resolved or alleviated?
Some answers can be discerned by a review of the cases in the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in which in banc attention has been granted or
denied since 1968, the effective date of the rule currently governing in banc
procedure in the courts of appeals.
II.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IN BANC PROCEDURE IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

Prior to 1891 there were no courts of appeals in the federal system. The
Evarts Act of 1891l a created courts of appeals interposed between the trial
courts and the Supreme Court, 15 and provided that the new courts "shall
consist of three judges."'1 6 Section 117 of the Judicial Code of 1911 continued
the provision that the courts consist of three judges, but section 118 increased
the number of judgeships in three circuits.1 7 By 1938, all but two circuits had
more than three judges;' 8 however, only the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia ever sat with more than three judges. 19
In 1940 a conflict arose between the Ninth and Third Circuits concerning
the power of a court of appeals to sit in banc. The Ninth Circuit, in a 1938
panel decision, held that section 117 of the Judicial Code mandated a court of
three judges-no more.2 In 1940, however, the Third Circuit began to decide
some cases in banc. 2' To resolve the conflict, the Supreme Court granted
12.

Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 578-86.

13. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function
of Review and the National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 551 (1969); Mars, Hearing and
Rehearing Cases In Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Mars].
14. Ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826.
15. See Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 569.
16. Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826.
17. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, §§ 117-18, 36 Stat. 1131.
18. See Act of Aug. 3, 1949, ch. 387, § 1, 63 Stat. 493; Historical & Revision Notes to 28
U.S.C. § 44 (1970); Note, The Power of a Circuit Court of Appeals to Sit En Banc, 55 Harv. L.
Rev. 663, 665-66 (1942).
19. Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 570-71 & n.60.
20. Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.), certified question answered,
304 U.S. 264 (1938).
21. See Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 67-71 (3d Cir. 1940) (en
banc), aff'd, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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certiorari in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Conmissioner,22 and decided
that a court of appeals has the inherent power to sit in banc. The Court held
unanimously that section 117 was impliedly amended by section 118, the
3
purpose of which was to create a court of all the active judges in the circuit?'
Congress codified the Textile Mills decision in section 46(c) of the Judicial
Code of 1948. Congress provided, however, that the more efficient panels
would continue to dispose of the bulk of appeals and stated that a majority
vote of the 'active judges in the circuit would be required for in banc
consideration. 24 Neither Textile Mills nor the Code of 1948 set forth any
particular procedure to follow, nor did either indicate what cases might be
appropriate for in banc consideration.
In 1953, in Westent Pacific R.R. Corp. v. Western Pacific R.R., 2 - the
Supreme Court held that a petitioner for a rehearing in banc could not compel
the court to take a vote on his petition; he could only suggest the advisability
of such a proceeding. However, a judge of the court could call sua sponte for
the vote. The Court did not indicate any particular procedure to be followed
but it did say that whatever procedure was settled upon should be
publicized. 2 6 After this decision, each circuit developed rules concerning the
in banc procedure. These rules, however, were not uniform, nor did they
fully explain the various intramural processes employed by
the different
7
circuits in dealing with petitions for proceedings in banc.
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure eliminates much of the
inconsistency. Rule 35 offers a procedure that is the same for all the courts of
appeals, although the intramural processes often remain slightly different.
Whether the rule has brought2 8equal uniformity to the treatnent of in banc
petitions remains to be seen.
III.

RULE 35 AND RELATED RULES

A. Rule 35
The text of rule 35 is as follows:
Determination of Causes by the Court in Banc
(a) When Hearing or Rehearing in Banc Will be Ordered. A majority- 9 of the
22. 314 U.S. 326 (1941). See generally Note, The Power of a Circuit Court of Appeals to Sit
En Banc, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 663 (1942); Comment, The En Banc Procedures of the United States
Courts of Appeals, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 447 (1954).
23. 314 U.S. at 331-35.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
25. 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
26. Id. at 267-68.
27. See Note, En Banc Procedure in the Federal Courts of Appeals, I I I U. Pa. L. Rev. 220
(1962).
28. See generally Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1973) (Hays,
Kaufman & Mansfield, J.J., concurring), vacated and remanded. 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
29. In a court of eight judges, the vote of four will not suffice-despite the fact that they may
be the majority of those voting. This does not mean that a majority of the court cannot form the
quorum needed to operate as an in banc court. See Alltmont v. United States. 177 F.2d 971, 973

(3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950). Abstention or disqualification is equivalent
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circuit judges who are in regular active service 30 may order 3 ' that an appeal or other
proceeding be heard or reheard 3 z by the court of appeals in banc. Such a hearing or
rehearing is not favored 33 and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when
consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its
decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
(b) Suggestion of a Party for Hearing or Rehearing in Banc. A party may suggest
the appropriateness of a hearing or rehearing in banc. 3 4 The clerk shall transmit any
such suggestion to the judges of the court who are in regular active service but a vote
will not be taken 35 to determine whether the cause shall be heard or reheard in bane
to a negative vote. Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 47 St. John's L. Rev. 339, 345-48
(1972).
30. See, e.g., Shenker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 374 U.S. 1, 4 (1963); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1020 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
There has been a problem defining active judges to be counted toward a majority. The
problem arose whether a senior judge could vote in deciding whether a case would be considered
in bane. It was decided that he could not vote and could not sit in bane. United States v.
American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 691 (1960). This result was changed by amending 28
U.S.C. § 46(c), which now allows a senior judge who sat on the original panel to call for a vote
and to sit in bane. However, he still may not vote for or against the holding of the in bane
proceeding. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(b); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 94 S. Ct. 2513, 2515-16
(1974). The status of other non-active judges remains unclear. See Accommodating Institutional
Responsibilities 597. Rule 35 also allows any judge who sat on a panel to call for a vote on
rehearing in bane. In addition, a judge who is sitting on a panel of a circuit court but who is not a
judge of the circuit may call for a vote on in bane consideration; but, again, he may not vote on
the question and he may not sit in bane. See, e.g., Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., supra at
2515-16; United States v. Hayden, 445 F.2d 1365, 1380 (9th Cir. 1971) (en bane); United States v.
Clay, 422 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1970) (en bane).
31. The procedure is available on the merits only, not on preliminary motions. Krakoff v.
United States, 431 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1970) (en bane).
32. A hearing is more efficient than a rehearing. Initial hearing in bane consumes less time
than rehearing after a panel has rendered a decision. Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 599; cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1026 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J.,
dissenting), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974) (155 days required for rehearing). Initial
hearing in bane also bypasses many of the problems peculiar to rehearings. The major difficulty
with an initial hearing in bane is that the importance of the issues or the possibility of a conflict
may not be apparent at this point. These would be more readily apparent after a panel decision.
However, postponing a hearing in banc until after a panel decision may cause unnecessary
duplication of effort for both the court and the litigants.
33. That in bane procedure is not favored is evidenced by the small number of in bane
proceedings held. In fiscal year 1973, the courts of appeals had oral hearing on 23 cases in bane of
a total of 6,555 cases heard during the year. 1973 Ann. Rep. 106. The primary cause for the
limited application of the procedure is the increasing size of the appellate docket. Expanding
backlogs pressure judges to increase terminations and panels are a far more efficient means to
that end. See, e.g., Waiters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 894-95 (2d Cir.
1963) (en banc); Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 574. Not only does a sitting in bane
occupy the entire bench, but in bane decisions take substantially longer to come down than do
panel decisions.
34. A party may not compel the court to act on the suggestion. See note 25 supra and
accompanying text.
35. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247 (1953); United States v.
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unless a judge in regular active service or a judge who was a member of the panel that
rendered a decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on such suggestion made by a
36
party.
(c) Time for Suggestion of a Party for Rehearing in Banc; " ' Suggestion Does Not
Stay Mandate. If a party desires to suggest a rehearing in banc, the suggestion must be
made within the time prescribed by Rule 40 for filing a petition for rehearing, whether
the suggestion is made in such petition or otherwise. 38 The pendency of such a
suggestion whether or not included in a petition for rehearing shall not affect the
finality of the judgment of the court of appeals or stay the issuance of the mandate. 9
Although rule 35 is of recent origin, 40 it is derived essentially from prior case
law 4 1 and statutes.4 2 These sources, along with the Advisory Committee
notes, 4 3 will be used to explain the rule.
Clay, 422 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1970) (en banc); United States v. Luis, 422 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1970) (en banc); General Ins. Co. of America v. United States, 409 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1969) (en
banc).
36. Nothing in the rule prevents a judge who is in active service or who sat on a panel from
requesting a vote sua sponte: "The rule merely authorizes a suggestion . . and provides that
suggestions will be directed to the judges of the court in regular active service." Advisory
Committee Note, Fed. R- App. P. 35, 28 U.S.C. (1970).
37. The rule is unclear as to when an original hearing in banc should be suggested. The best
time and place would seem to be in the original brief. The clerk could then transmit the
suggestion to the court prior to the assignment of the panel. However, this procedure is
mandatory in only one circuit. D.C. Cir. R. 14. A suggestion for rehearing may be, but need not
be, contained in a formal petition. Advisory Committee Note, Fed. R. App. P. 35, 28 U.S.C.
(1970). This is in accord with Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247
(1953), which said that the issues of a panel rehearing and rehearing in banc are to be considered
separately. Since a formal petition is not required for a rehearing, apparently one is not required
earlier. A suggestion for an original hearing in banc could be made in the form of a written, or
even an oral, motion. See id.
38. The suggestion that a case be reheard in banc is most often contained in a petition for
panel rehearing. It is treated as a petition for panel rehearing with a suggestion for an in banc
proceeding. It may be dealt with by the panel that rendered the decision without considering the
suggestion. Advisory Committee Note, Fed. R. App. P. 35, 28 U.S.C. (1970).
39. Compare this with the effect of the petition for rehearing itself. See Fed. R. App. P 41
Only one circuit has a rule concerning the effect of granting the suggestion. Rule 3(b) of the Si:-th
Circuit provides that, upon the grant of the suggestion, the previous judgment will be vacated,
the mandate stayed, and the case returned to the docket as pending appeal. This provision is
similar to and consistent with the provisions in rules 40 and 41 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure relative to rehearings. Rule 40 provides: "If a petition for rehearing is granted the court
may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument or may restore it to the calendar for
reargument or resubmission or may make such other orders as are deemed appropriate ...
"
Fed. R. App. P. 40(a). Rule 41 provides that the mandate will be stayed, upon timely filing of a
petition for rehearing, until the court disposes of the petition.
40. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were adopted by order of the Supreme Court
on December 4, 1967 to be effective July 1, 1968. 389 U.S. 1065 (1967).
41. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247 (1953); Textile Mills
Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
43. The Advisory Committee notes are found in Fed. R. App. P. 35, 28 U.S.C. (1970).
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B.

Related Rules in the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure
It might be said that a rehearing in banc is just another type of rehearing 44
and that rule 35 simply imposes two additional criteria upon those used to
determine whether a case should be reheard by a panel. 4 5 There are indications within the rule and the Advisory Committee Notes that this is the intent
of the Committee. The rule imposes the same time limit for a suggestion as
does rule 40 for a petition for rehearing. In addition, the Advisory Committee
Note states that "[t]he rule merely authorizes a suggestion, imposes a time
limit on suggestions for rehearings in banc, and provides that suggestions will
be directed to the judges of the court in regular active service." '46 This
self-imposed limitation implies that the rules for the granting of a rehearing
by a panel still apply.
The rule that governs petitions for rehearing by a panel is rule 40. It
provides a fourteen day time limit to file, 47 starting the day after judgment is
entered. The time limit may be lengthened or shortened at the discretion of
the court.4 8 The petition for rehearing will contain a statement that sets forth
with particularity the points that the petitioner feels have been overlooked or
misapprehended. 49 The idea of a rehearing is not to reargue the case, 50 but to
call to the attention of the court some material fact or point of law that was
not properly considered by the court and that would have produced a
different outcome. 5' The petition may also contain an argument in support of
rehearing.5 2 Since the petitions rarely are granted, answers are, for the most
part, unnecessary, as well as wasteful of time and money. 53 However, the
court may request an answer. The petition "will ordinarily not be granted in
the absence of such a request. ''54 The court may then dispose of the case
"without reargument or may restore it to the calendar for reargument or
resubmission or may make such other orders as are deemed appropriate under
the circumstances of the particular case." s s
C. Related Courts of Appeals Rules
The courts of appeals may still make and amend rules for practice within
the circuits. 5 6 Rule 47 provides that these rules are to be enacted by the
44. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005,
dissenting), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).

45.

1025 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J.,

Compare Fed. R. App. P. 35(a) with Fed. R. App. P. 40(a).

46. Advisory Committee Note, Fed. R. App. P. 35(c), 28 U.S.C. (1970); see Fed. R. App. P.
40(a).
47. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a). Both 28 U.S.C. (1970) and 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed.
1973) have comprehensive time schedules.
48. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a).
49. Id.
50. Anderson v. Knox, 300 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1962).
51. NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 206 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1953) (en banc).
52.
Fed. R. App. P. 40(a).
53. See Advisory Committee Note, Fed. R. App. P. 40, 28 U.S.C. (1970).
54. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a).
55. Id.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970).
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majority of the court, and are not to be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. They may supplement the Federal Rules or they may
regulate matters not governed by the Federal Rules.-7 These rules generally
are administrative and housekeeping, concerned for the most part with
matters other than actual courtroom procedure; however, in some cases they
are applicable to a procedure under the Federal Rules. All but three5 8 of the
circuits have a rule that applies to the in banc procedure," but of these only
three provide any additions to the requirements of rule 35.60
IV. IN BANC PROCEEDINGS: WHEN AND WHY
Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure states that a case
will be heard by the court in banc only: "(1) when consideration by the full
court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2)
when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." '6'
In United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 62 Justice Stewart,
quoting Judge Maris, 63 stated the main purpose of the in banc procedure as
follows:
"The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in banc is to enable

the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it possible for a majority
of its judges always to control and thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in its
decisions, while enabling the court at the same time to follow the efficient and
time-saving procedure of having panels of three judges hear and decide the vast
majority of cases as to which no division exists within the court." 64
Justice Stewart called for the use of the in banc procedure in the extraordinary cases which require "authoritative consideration and decision by those
' 65
charged with the administration and development of the law of the circuit.
57.

Fed. R App. P. 47. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 83.

58. The Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have no rule relating to the in banc proceeding.

59. See D.C. Cir. R. 14; 1st Cir. R. 16; 3d Cir. R. 2(3), 22; 5th Cir. R. 12; 6th Cir. R. 3(b);
7th Cir. R. 4(b); 8th Cir. R. 7; 9th Cir. R. 12.
60. Rule 14 of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit states that a
suggestion for an in banc proceeding, if not in a petition for a rehearing, shall be filed on the date
the appellee's brief is due. It also provides that the suggestion shall not exceed ten pages and shall
be served in compliance with rule 25 of the Federal Rules. This rule makes eminent sense. It
covers an area not covered by the Federal Rules and clarifies when and how a suggestion should
be made to the court that a case is appropriate for consideration in banc on original hearing.
Rule 3(b) of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit clarifies the effect of granting a rehearing
in bahc by treating it as a regular rehearing.
Rule 12 of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit simply provides that where a suggestion
for a rehearing in banc is contained within a petition for rehearing, the cover of the combined
suggestion-petition must state that a suggestion is contained within it.
61. Fed. R_ App. P. 35(a).
62. 363 U.S. 685 (1960).
63. The Honorable Albert B. Mlaris, senior judge of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, was Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and a
member of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules.
64. 363 U.S. at 689-90 (quoting Maris 96).
65. 363 U.S. at 689.
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These statements explain the underlying purpose of the in banc procedure:
the maintenance of control over the decisions within the circuit. The cases
that are to be heard or reheard in banc are limited to the areas in which there
is either a possible split by a minority within the circuit, resulting in the loss
of majority control over some decisions, 66 or an issue of such major import to
the circuit as67 to make desirable the exercise of the greater authority of the
entire court.
It is often difficult to categorize in banc cases as representative of either of
the above two criteria. The opinions in banc rarely speak of the particular
reason why the case is being considered in banc. In some cases, however, a
judge writes a dissent to a denial that gives some reasons why he feels the
particular case should have been considered in banc. In these instances the
judges rarely limit themselves to simply one category. 68 It appears that this
reflects the very nature of the cases most likely to be granted consideration in
banc: cases in which both criteria are present.69 The nature and content of the
criteria are less predictable, however. A review of the cases heard in banc by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit since the effective date of rule 35
does not lead to neatly identifiable categories and generalizations. However, it
is possible to delineate some general characteristics that are indicative of a
case that would be granted in banc consideration.
A. In Bane Proceeding to Maintain Uniformity of Decisions
The courts of appeals have a duty to develop the federal law with
uniformity. 70 This, of necessity, requires that different panels of a court of
appeals in the same circuit adhere to the prior decisions of other panels in the
same circuit. Otherwise a litigant would be at7 the mercy of the fortuitous
composition of the panel assigned to his case. '
A subsequent panel decision may, of course, overrule a prior panel decision. A panel is not meant to be controlled by precedent that is inadequate,
outmoded, or wrongly decided. 72 However, where there is disagreement
about the correctness of a decision among the active circuit judges, conflicts
may develop in later decisions when these judges feel the need and exert their
right to overrule the prior decision. 73 The in banc process is designed, or at
66. Mars 96.
67. Id. at 97; Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 894 (2d Cir. 1963) (en
banc). See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
68. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1021, 1026 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes,
J., dissenting), vacated & remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974); Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
69. See Maris 97.
70. Id. at 96; Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 578.
71. See Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 Wis.
L. Rev. 461.
72. K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 78-83 (1960).
73. See Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 Wis.
L. Rev. 461, 476-77.
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least intended, to serve this function. 74 In a proceeding in banc all the active
judges in the circuit establish a rule of the majority for the circuit. While it
always remains a possibility that the outvoted minority might try to circumvent the majority, this is less likely in the face of the more authoritative in
banc precedent
than it would be where there were merely precedential panel
75
decisions.

"Mere disagreement, or likelihood of disagreement, with the panel decision,
has not generally been regarded as sufficient reason for a further hearing ....
,"76 Although it is often in the interest of efficient judicial administration to hear a case in banc where a possibility of conflict exists, the issues that
are likely to cause dissension among the judges of a circuit are rarely apparent
prior to the assignment of cases to the various panels. 7 7 A judge might request
78
a vote on in banc hearing when he has read the briefs, or after argument.
However, the possibility of a disagreement or conflict with prior panel
decisions rarely is evidenced even at this time.
The most appropriate time for determining when the issue presents an
imminent conflict among panel decisions is between the time a judge writes
the panel decision and the time the case is finally decided. At this time, if the
decision of the panel is circulated among the active judges of the circuit for
their suggestions on the decision as written, the non-sitting judges have the
best means possible to grasp the implications of the decision. The) can call for
a hearing in banc before the decision is published, thereby avoiding many of
the problems of a rehearing in banc. This process also allows members of
other panels to compare their own unpublished decisions with the circulated
opinion and thus provides an opportunity to prevent a conflict by consolidating the cases for hearing in banc.
The goal of securing or maintaining uniformity, in and of itself, is unlikely
to trigger review in banc. Cases in the Second Circuit reveal that, where the
court has expressed or implied that uniformity was a reason for granting in
banc consideration, the substantive issues have often, but not always, met the
74.

See Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957) (per curiam); In re Burwell,

350 U.S. 521, 522 (1956).

75.

Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 894 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc); see

Mais 97.

76.

Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 894 (2d Cir. 1963) (en bane).

Where a number of cases presenting similar issues have resulted in inconsistent decisions in the
district court (see, e.g., Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en bane), rev'd sub
nom. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities

586), the cases are often consolidated upon appeal and given to a panel rather than heard in banc.
There is no rule in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure that allows such action. However,
rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows such action in cases with a "common
question of law or fact." Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that these rules
apply to cases in the United States District Courts. But for some authority that these rules apply
to appellate proceedings, see 2 J. Moore, Federal Practice 1.13, at 281-86 & 9 id. 201.08[1], at
534-36 (2d ed. 1974) (citing Maryland Cas. Co. v. Conner, 382 F.2d 13 (10th Cir. 1967)).
77. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 197 F.2d 994, 1014 (9th Cir. 1951),
vacated and remanded, 345 U.S. 247 (1953); Maris 93.
78. See Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 727.
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alternative requirement of rule 35 as well, 79 viz., "questions of exceptional
importance." 8 0
Even in cases where the court in banc does not make reference to issues of
importance, there is frequently a marked parallel between the issues in the
cases under consideration and other cases given in banc attention. For
instance, in two companion cases, 8 1 where confusion in the circuit and
misinterpretation of an earlier circuit case were apparent reasons for granting
in banc consideration, 8 2 the substantive issues on appeal centered on whether
an evidentiary hearing was required on a habeas corpus petition where
defendant contested the voluntariness of his confession or guilty plea. The
court made no reference to the importance of the case, but civil rights cases
have often been considered important and given in banc consideration in the
83
Second Circuit.
In cases in which a prior decision of the circuit is reversed by a panel or
where circuit judges disagree with their earlier decisions on a panel, uniformity seems to be the paramount factor underlying the decision to grant in
banc review. In several such cases in the Second Circuit, the substantive
issues do not seem to fall within any category of exceptionally important
cases.
For instance, Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. 84 involved a
breach of duty claim by a trustee in reorganization against the trustee of an
indenture. The court apparently accepted the case in banc to exert its control
over the panel, which had reversed a circuit case of long standing. The court
in banc reversed the panel's decision. 85 In Local 1251 UAW v. Robertshaw
Controls Co., 8 6 a case concerning the construction and validity of a labor
contract, the court in banc took the opportunity to overrule a prior circuit
decision which had been ill received 8 7 and, the court asserted, erroneous in its
rationale and result.8 8 A more complex case, United States v. Tarrago"9
included elements that could be labelled "exceptionally important." The issue
considered in banc concerned the retroactive effect on Tarrago of the adoption
in another Second Circuit case decided while Tarrago was on appeal, 90 of a
79. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); United States v. Gonzales, 442 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1970)
(en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.) (en
banc) (consolidated with Stevens v. Tyng), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
80. This criterion is discussed in subsection B, infra.
81. United States ex rel. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 397
U.S. 759 (1969); United States ex rel. Rosen v. Follette, 409 F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1969) (en banc),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 930 (1970).
82. See 409 F.2d at 1019-22; 409 F.2d at 1043-44.
83. See also 1973 Ann. Rep. 126 (increase in prisoner petitions).
84. 439 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), aff'd, 406 U.S. 416 (1972).
85.

Id. at 120, 123-24.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

405 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
Id.at 31-32.
Id.at 33.
398 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
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broader rule of criminal responsibility. In accepting the case in banc, the
court wished to re-examine, and ultimately it reaffirmed, 9 1 a prior panel
decision. 92 Although the case involved an important issue, desire for unifor93
mity was an equally strong catalyst in the mind of at least one judge.
In Banc Hearing or Rehearing for Issues of
Exceptional Importance
When an issue is important enough to merit a proceeding in banc is a
difficult determination and has been the subject of controversy. 94 The language of rule 35 sets forth but one qualification---"exceptional." Many cases
are important: they have impact beyond their own facts, involve large sums
of money, are complicated, or concern many litigants. However, in the light
of the ever increasing caseload, it is obvious that all such cases cannot be
granted the attention of the entire court. Indeed there is no reason to suggest
that panels are in any way incapable of handling important issues. 9s
In Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, InC., 9 6 a case which predated rule
35, Chief Judge Lumbard of the Second Circuit set forth some general
requirements for the in banc procedure. The most important requirement was
that "the case [involve] an issue likely to affect many other cases."9 7 Such an
issue is one which is "of sufficient concern to enough litigants who are or may
become involved in similar situations so that the even-handed administration
of justice will be benefited by a decision by the entire court" 9 8 Judge
Lumbard further qualified the proper case as one which presents a legal
principle, not just an application of a principle to the facts. 99 Indeed it has
been said that an in banc proceeding will not be used to take an appeal from a
criminal trial on its facts and there has been a general rule, at least in the
Second Circuit, that an in banc proceeding will not be invoked to resolve an
injustice that is personal in nature.' 0 0
Since the inception of rule 35, the requirements set forth by Chief Judge
Lumbard have interlocked in a number of cases and given rise to a category
of cases that might be designated as leading.
B.

91.

398 F.2d at 623.

92. United States v. Sheller, 369 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1966).
because it
93. Chief Judge Lumbard stated: "I voted in favor of en banc consideration
seemed to me that it is important in all situations where, after submission to all active judges, we
announce a new rule for the district courts to apply in determining issues raised in criminal cases
that . . . the court should pass upon the question of the extent to which the new rule is to be
applied to cases tried prior to . . . [announcement of]the new rule." 398 F.2d at 625.
94. See Maris 97.
95. Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 587-89.
96. 312 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc).
97. Id.at 894.
98. Id.
99. See Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc), revd sub nom. Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). See also United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 801 (2d Cir.)

(en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972).
100. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing Eisen v.Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1021-22 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974)).
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United States v. Collins'' is an example. The court in Collins heard an
appeal in banc "to resolve what appeared to be a difference of view"10 "
regarding the requirements of a statement 0 3 in the opinion in Miranda v.
Arizona'04 concerning the interrogation of suspects. The resolution would
determine whether defendant's confession of armed robbery should have been
excluded at the trial. The court heard the appeal in banc because it involved a
legal principle noting that it "would not have directed rehearing in banc
merely to resolve a question of fact in a particular case."' 0 5
Galella v. Onassis ° 6 is perhaps a classic example of a case that involved a
question of personal injustice and apparently lacked the elements normally
found in an in banc proceeding. Appeal was taken by the plaintiff to contest a
panel's modification of an injunction against the photographer defendant who
07
had harassed the plaintiff, wife of a former President, and her children.
Rejecting the argument of the dissenting judges that modification of injunctive relief was "an unwarranted appellate interference with the district court's
discretion, ' 08 the majority' 0 9 asserted:
Wholly aside from our view whether it was proper for the panel to modify the district

court's decree, we cannot agree with [the dissenting judges'] assessment of the
importance of the question before us.
[I]t hardly need be stated that the importance of a decision does not turn on
whether the litigants stand in the limelight of public recognition or in the shadows of
anonymity. Rather, significance rests on the precedential impact that a determination
of this Court is likely to have . . . on the lives of countless others.
[T]he panel's decision does not rise to the threshold of importance requisite to en
[..
banc reconsideration." 0

"Controversial" is another term used to characterize cases that reach the
importance requisite to in banc consideration."' Exemption of conscientious
1 12
objectors, civil rights litigation, subversive activities, the death sentence,
113
In the
and extraordinary actions against public officials are examples.
101.
102.

462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972).
Id.at 801.

103.

" 'If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,

that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.' " Id. at 796 n.6 (quoting Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)). The issue in Collins was whether this sentence required
that interrogation stop forever or whether it permitted resumption in proper circumstances.
104. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
105. 462 F.2d at 802.
106. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
107. Id. at 1004.
108. Id. at 1005 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
109. The majority determined that the panel had used the correct standard of appellate
review. Id. at 1004.
110. Id.
111. See Maris 97.
112. Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 588-89.
113. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); Helfant v. Kugler, 484 F.2d
1277 (3d Cir. 1973) (rehearing en banc granted), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3087 (U.S.
Aug. 6, 1974) (No. 74-80).
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Second Circuit, for example, issues touching the civil rights of individuals
have received a great deal of attention in banc: search and seizure, " 4 denial
of a speedy trial, 115 voluntariness of confessions,' 16 the right of indigents to
be told of their right to appeal conviction at state expense,"1 7 jurisdiction of
the courts,' 18 state prisoners' rights under a civil rights statute,11 9 and
freedom of the press.' 20 The language of Judge Kaufman in Sostre v.
McGinnis' 2' is perhaps representative of both the attitude of judges toward
cases involving civil rights and of other factors that prompt in banc
consideration: 122
We voted to hear the initial argument . . . en banc, a procedure we reserve

for extraordinary circumstances, so that we might give plenary review to a complex of
urgent social and political conflicts [infra] persistently seeking solution in the courts as
legal problems .... The elaborate opinion and order below raise important questions
concerning the federal constitutional rights of state prisoners which neither Supreme
Court precedent nor our own past decisions have answered. The sparse23authority from
other courts is for the most part either inconclusive or conflicting.'

Many cases in the Second Circuit have involved the interpretation of
federal statutes.1 24 Often this concerns a new or broader application of the
114.
Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane), rev'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971).
See also United States v. Toscanino, No. 73-2732, at 5633 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 1974) (Mulligan, J.,
dissenting).
115. United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc).
116. United States ex rel. Vanderhorst v. LaVallee, 417 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1969) (en bane).
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970).
117. United States ex rel. Witt v. La Vallee, 424 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc); United
States ex rel.
Smith v. McMann, 417 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
925 (1970).
118. IBM v. United States, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane); Scanapico v. Richmond,
F. & P.R.R., 439 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc) (New York long arm -tatute; corporation
"doing business"); Minichielo v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 844 (1969) (quasi in rem action based on attachment of nonresident's insurance policy).
119. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
120. United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc), rev'd, 403
U.S. 713 (1971).
121. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
122. In several cases the Second Circuit has found the civil rights issue of such importance
that it has granted review despite the general rule that in bane proceedings should not be used to
resolve factual issues involving an injustice that is personal in nature. Williams v. Adams, 441
F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev'd, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (habeas corpus; probable cause for
arrest, search, and seizure). See also United States ex rel. Whitmore v. Malcolm, 476 F.2d 363
(2d Cir. 1973) (en bane) (habeas corpus; appeal mooted); United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992
(2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971) (probable cause for arrest, search, and
seizure).
123. 442 F.2d at 181.
124. E.g., Hartman Tobacco Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane)
(Internal Revenue Code); NLRB v. Marsellus Vault & Sales, Inc., 431 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1970)
(en banc) (National Labor Relations Act). See also United States v. New York Times Co., 444

414
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statute. 125 This has been particularly true in cases where liability is predicated on section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934126 and rule
10b-5 promulgated under that Act.1 27 The court's statement in the most
recent of these cases 128 could have been made with respect to each of the six
section 10(b)' 29 and rule 10b-5 cases that have been heard in banc since 1968
when rule 35 became effective: "We sit en banc to decide a question important
to the course of evolution of the law . .
-130 That evolution, in turn, has
far-reaching significance on future litigation.
The fact that a case affects many parties or potential litigations or involves
large sums of money does not guarantee nor even make probable in banc
consideration. The cases defy generalization. Who, for instance, could have
predicted that the Second Circuit would grant in banc consideration in United
States v. Certain Property,131 for the purpose of deciding the measure of
damages for short term leaseholders who owned trade fixtures in condemned
structures, 132 but would deny in banc consideration in two cases, Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin133 and Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 134 involving the
requirements for a class action under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. And who could have predicted denial in a case involving equal
136
protection standards, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre. 135 The denials
certainly focused on issues that potentially would affect more future cases
than the condemnation case and therefore, would seem to merit additional
attention. An examination and comparison of the cases is instructive. Boraas
F.2d 544 (2d Cir.) (en bane), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (18 U.S.C. §§ 792-99 (1970) (unlawful
disclosure of classified information)).
125. The use of in banc procedure is in accord with the nature of the cases that Judge Marls
suggested should be given in banc consideration, i.e., those "where an important new principle
of law or the construction of a new statute or the determination of a new point of procedure of
widespread interest is involved and the court is divided in opinion or regards the matter to be of
such importance as to call for the more authoritative opinion of seven judges ....
" Mars 97.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
128. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
129. Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en bane) (involving § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, an
antifraud provision similar to § 10(b)); SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see note 128 supra.
130. 479 F.2d at 1279.
131. 388 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
132. The court apparently granted in bane review because it found merit in the tenants'
contentions: (1) the panel's decision "would have a serious effect on similar fixture claims of
tenants in other condemnations pending in the circuit" and (2) the panel's discussion "ran counter
to relevant portions of recent decisions of two other panels." Id. at 600.
133. 479 F.2d 1005, 1020 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
134. 469 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1972), afi'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
135. 476 F.2d 806, 824 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
136. See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 494 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
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was a civil rights action challenging the constitutionality of a village zoning
ordinance which limited occupancy of one-family dwellings to traditional
families or to groups of not more than two unrelated persons. The panel,
reversing the district court, 137 determined that the ordinance violated the
equal protection clause. The Second Circuit, splitting four to four, denied in
banc review. Dissenting from the denial, Judge Timbers argued that the
version of the new equal protection standard applied by the majority of the
panel was a "substantial question of unusual importance,"'' 38 because, inter
alia, the panel had applied an equal protection test different than that held
applicable in a recent Supreme Court decision, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.' 39 In addition, Judge Timbers asserted, the
panel's decision when read in conjunction with recent decisions of two other
panels "makes it virtually impossible for a district court in this Circuit, or
a panel of our Court, to determine what equal protection standard to apply in
a case before it."' 40 Replying to the dissent, Judge Mansfield denied that the
case was "one of those truly extraordinary cases that warrants review en
bane' 14 1 because "[i]f anything, our decision here is in accord with the Supreme
Court's decision in Rodriguez.' 4 2 In addition, Judge Mansfield argued that
an in banc hearing would not clarify the area of equal protection because
in pursuing the elusive quest for standards we are dealing with broad general
principles which must be capable of adaption to widely varying factual contexts.
Nothing . . . could be sufficiently precise to have a binding effect throughout the
Circuit in other cases, which would inevitably involve significantly different factors,
especially since our views would be expressed by a divided court, with district judges
looking primarily to the Supreme Court for ultimate guidance.1'4
The reasons for denial of in banc review in Eisen appear, on first
impression, to bear sharp contrast to the reasons for denial in Boraas. Where
Boraas was not of sufficient importance to warrant an in banc proceeding,
Eisen was of "such extraordinary consequence" that surely the Supreme
Court would grant certiorari.'44 Eisen was an antitrust class action brought
on behalf of all odd lot investors in securities to recover excessive commissions. On appeal, the case centered on the question whether the named
plaintiff must give actual notice to those class members whose identities could
be ascertained with reasonable certainty. As in Boraas, inconsistency within
the circuit and district courts was asserted.' 45 Concurring in the denial, Judge
Mansfield reasoned that because the case was of exceptional importance it
should be resolved by "the most authoritative resolution possible. If the recent
137.
(1973).
138.

367 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.), affd, 414 U.S. 291
476 F.2d at 825 (Timbers, J., dissenting).

139.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).

140.
141.
142.
143.

476 F.2d at 825 (Timbers, J.,dissenting).
Id.at 829.
Id.at 828.
Id.

144. 479 F.2d at 1020.

145.

Id. at 1025 (Oakes, J.,dissenting).
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history of en banc proceedings in this Court is any indication, however, an en
banc hearing would result in opinions expressing
diverse views, necessitating
1 46
ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court.'

The reasons advanced by Judge Mansfield in Boraas and Eisen offer
several conclusions: if the Supreme Court has already ruled on the issue and
the instant case is in accord, the case is not important enough for in banc
consideration; if the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, the case may
be too important to warrant delay in in banc proceedings. In either case, if
there is too much diversity of opinion within the circuit, the majority of
circuit judges may decide that an in banc proceeding would be futile.
Thus, by an ironic twist, both criteria for granting in banc consideration
under rule 35 have been used to deny in banc consideration, i.e., if the case is
too important or if there is too much diversity of opinion.
What might be called the "majority test" of importance found expression in
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co. 147 There, a minority of three active judges
blocked in banc reconsideration' 48 despite the fact that four active judges had
voted to grant it. 149 In defending the majority requirement of rule 35, the

provision which fostered the anomalous result,' 50 Judge Mansfield stated:
"The majority requirement serves the further salutary purpose of limiting en
banc hearings to questions of exceptional importance rather than allow the
court to drift into the unfortunate habit of requiring such hearings in every
15
case where a minority of the court may desire a decision by the full court.' '
In an emphatic dissent, Judge Timbers focused on the substantive issue of the
case, the question of whether the unnamed parties in a class action must
satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) in a
diversity suit.'

s2

The importance of this issue negated, in Judge Timbers'

mind, the justifications offered by Judge Mansfield for denial. In a later
case'- 3 in which Judge Timbers again analyzed the mechanics of Zahn, he
noted that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Zahn, "thus laying at
rest any notion that the issue which four of the active judges of this Court had
voted to reconsider en banc was not a substantial question of unusual
importance. "154
C. Additional Factors Influencing Decisions to Grant
In Banc Consideration
While not sufficient of themselves, in conjunction with an important or
divisive issue there are three additional factors that might add to the
desirability of an in banc hearing or rehearing. These factors are: stymied
panels, intercircuit conflict, and the service of non-active 'judges on the
146.

Id. at 1021 (Mansfield, J., concurring).

147.

469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973).

148.
149.
150.

They stated that it appeared that the panel would be affirmed in any case. Id. at 1040.
For an explanation of this result, see text accompanying note 177 infra.
For a discussion and criticism of the majority rule, see section V(D), infra.

151.

469 F.2d at 1041.

152.
153.

Id. at 1042 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
IBM v. United States, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).

154.

Id. at 304.
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panel. 155 The first is a very rare occurrence. 5 6 The second, while not rare, is
seldom resolved by an in banc proceeding. A court of appeals in banc may, of
course, attempt to harmonize its decision or decisions with those of other
courts of appeals, S7 but, ultimately, intercircuit conflict must be resolved in
the Supreme Court. The third factor, the service of non-active judges on a
panel, is apparently a substantial consideration in deciding whether or not to
grant rehearing in banc.158 This is in accord with the stated purpose of rule
35-to maintain majority control over important issues and to secure or
maintain uniformity of decision. It can be argued that non-active judges are
not likely to be as familiar with the law of the circuit; that they have less
prestige than the active judges of a court of appeals; and that there is
consequently a likelihood of review or reversal of their decisions by the court

in banc.
V.

PROBLEMS WITH THE IN BANC PROCEDURE

A number of problems relating to in banc procedure have developed. The
major ones will be discussed below, with suggestions for alleviation where
that appears possible.

A. Lost Efficiency
The major problem with an in banc proceeding is the resulting loss of
efficiency. 159 A court comprised of three judges can decide a case in less time
than a court comprised of seven to fifteen judges.' 60 This is a natural
corollary to the fact that an in banc proceeding gives greater advance
exploration 1 6' to the issues since the court is opened to more discussion and
62
thus to potentially more divergent views.155. Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 592-98.
156. Id. at 593. A stymied panel is one in which no two judges can agree on what to do.
157. In the Second Circuit, intercircuit conflict apparently has been a factor in granting in
banc review in at least two cases. United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d 1133, 1135 (2d Cir.) (en
banc) vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Hopkins, 94 . Ct. 3201 (1974);
Hartman Tobacco Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1327, 1330 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) ("[W]e
think it best to clear up any confusion on the issue [capital gains treatment on transfer of a right to
remove sand and gravel from land] that there may be in this circuit and to align the Second
Circuit with every other circuit which has confronted the question."). See also Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the
National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542, 612 et seq. (1969).
158. Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 595-98.
159. See id. at 576-77. A study of the period 1956 through 1964 found the average disposition
time for a panel in the Second Circuit was two and one-half months after oral argument. The
disposition time for a case heard in banc was four and one-half months. When the case was heard
in banc after a panel had been assigned to it the time between argument and decision was eight to
eleven months. Id. at 577. In 1973, the median time from hearing or submission to final
disposition was 7 months. 1973 Ann. Rep. 310 (Table B-4). The same period was 155 days when
a case was reheard in banc. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005. 1026 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Oakes, J., dissenting), vacated & remanded, 94 S. CL 2140 (1974).
160. All the courts of appeals have at least seven judges except the First Circuit.
161. K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 314 (1960).
162. The high incidence of disagreement in the in banc courts is one indication of this. See
Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 608 (App. IV).
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When the increase in the time required for decision is considered in
conjunction with the lost service 163 of judges who could be occupied elsewhere the procedure becomes even more onerous. This is particularly true in
those circuits that are already hard-pressed to keep the current backlog to a
minimum.
The in banc procedure is inherently and unavoidably time-consuming. So
long as it is used it will, ipso facto, slow the courts' business-yet it is
necessary. There is no answer to this dilemma. It is suggested, ho'wever, that
the creation of additional circuits and new judgeships could help alleviate the
more general problem of backlog in the courts of appeals. 164 The creation of
new judgeships alone might be unwise since it has become apparent in the
Fifth (15 judges) and Ninth (13 judges) Circuits that there is an inherent
institutional limit to the size of a court. Inter alia, it is extremely difficult for a
court so large to sit in banc. 165
B.

The Power of a Court In Banc

Since each panel is considered to be the court of appeals, 66 it may be asked
whether the court in banc constitutes a superior court situated between the
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals. It might be contended that, as
such, the court in banc is not authorized. This raises two questions about the
power of the court in banc.
First, can the court limit the issues it will consider when rehearing a case in
banc? A rehearing on limited issues might seem to constitute a kind of
appellate review of the panel decision. This would be inconsistent with the in
banc court's rehearing function which is not to review panel decisions but to
rehear appeals. Nevertheless, it is clear from the cases that the court in banc
can limit the issues it will consider on rehearing. 167 This result seems, if not
logically indisputable, at least necessary, as a practical matter. Of course it
may be argued that a rehearing in banc is just another kind of rehearing and
that rehearings may be limited in scope; 168 but, more simply and more
163.

For instance, there are currently eight active judges in the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit. (Although nine judgeships are authorized, one is vacant at the present time.) At a
minimum, these judges could comprise two full panels to hear cases while two judges write

opinions or tend to administrative matters. With the services of non-active judges assigned to the
court the number of panels could be as high as eight. There is apparently no limitation upon the
number of non-active judges who may sit on a panel.
164.

The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System has recommended

the creation of two new circuits, through realignment of the present Fifth and Ninth Circuits, as
a necessary first step in coping with the administrative problems of the courts of appeals.
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical Boundaries of
the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change 3 (1973).
165. Id. at 1-2.
166. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
167
E.g., United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
988 (1972); Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 317 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc), noted
in 77 Harv. L. Rev. 767 (1964).
168. Louisell & Degnan, Rehearing in American Appellate Courts, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 627, 651
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importantly, it must be noted that limiting issues saves time. This alone
would seem sufficient justification for the practice, at least where other
arguments pro and con are inconclusive.
The second, and more difficult, problem is related to the first and involves
the power of the court in banc to decide a case-a power which requires the
court in banc to exercise authority over the panel. An example would be an
order of remand to the panel for further consideration in light of the decision
of the court in banc.1 69 The question is whether the court in banc has such
power. There is neither denial nor affirmance of authority for such an order in
the rules or related statutes. Although the order seems to create a superior
court, the procedure saves time and is in accord with the mandate of the
conference to create rules which bring about just and speedy determination of
cases. 170 The procedure is at least tolerated by the Supreme Court, which has
the procedure
not yet seen fit to deny its application in the instances where
17 1
has been before the Court, either directly or indirectly.
C.

Oral Argument

The litigant has no absolute right to an oral argument before the court in
banc, at least on rehearing; rather, it appears that the litigant has a qualified
right 172 to an oral argument subject to suspension by rule 2171 or by
agreement of the parties.174 However, the circuits have adopted the practice
of making in banc sittings upon the briefs alone, without oral argument.
This procedure, while more expeditious, seems incongruous considering the
nature of the proceeding. If a case is important enough to warrant the time
required for in banc consideration, it would seem also to warrant the minimal
additional time needed for oral argument.
An issue which is to be heard in banc is generally one which transcends the
facts of the particular case. 17 5 As a result, the judges may choose to plumb
orally an issue which was not fully explored in the brief. This is particularly
(1956); see Fed. R. App. P. 40 ("The petition [for rehearing] shall state with particularity the
points of law or fact which in the opinion of the petitioner the court has overlooked or
misapprehended .... ").
169. See Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 317 F.2d 875, 886 (2d Cir. 1963) (en bane)
(Waterman, J., dissenting).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
171. See American-Foreign S.S. Corp. v. United States, 265 F.2d 136 (2d Cir 1958) (en
banc), vacated and remanded, 363 U.S. 685 (1960); Herzog v. United States, 235 F.2d 664 (9th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956).
172. "Unless otherwise provided by rule for all cases or for classes of cases, each side will be
allowed 30 minutes for argument." Fed. R. App. P. 34(b).
173. "In the interest of expediting decision, or for other good cause shown, a court of appeals
may . . . suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case on
application of a party or on its own motion and may order proceedings in accordance with its
direction." Fed. R. App. P. 2.
174. "By agreement of the parties, a case may be submitted for decision on the briefs, but the
court may direct that the case be argued." Fed. R. App. P. 34(f).
175. See section IV(B) supra.
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true because the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure impose 7 6 limitations
of form and style upon briefs which are to be submitted to a court of appeals.
D.

Disqualified Judges and the Majority Rule
When an active judge is disqualified from voting on a suggestion for in
banc consideration, he is nevertheless counted as a member of the court
in active service. Since a majority of the court in service must vote in favor of
in banc consideration, disqualification operates as a negative vote.' 7 7 This
effect seems contrary to the rule that a judge who is disqualified may not act
in determining any cause from which he is barred. 178 One alternative would
be to allow the disqualified judge to vote on the suggestion. The better
alternative, however, would be to allow the requisite majority to be decreased
in this instance so that a majority of judges voting would suffice to carry the
vote. Although it has been argued 179 that allowing a majority of voting judges
to carry the motion may have the effect of allowing a minority of the court to
control the majority, it is more important, as Judge Timbers noted in IBM v.
United States, 180 that issues of importance receive in banc consideration than
it is that the vote of a single judge could block in banc attention.' 8 '
There has been dissatisfaction expressed with the need for a majority where
an in banc sitting could not be had because of an evenly split vote. Where the
court is comprised of an even number of judges, it would seem that the split
vote ought to be sufficient to prompt the court to sit together to attempt to
resolve an issue about which there is clearly serious disagreement. 182
176. Fed. R. App. P. 28, 32.
177. For instance, in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1972),
aff'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973), a minority of three active judges voting to deny in banc reconsideration prevailed -over four active judges who voted to grant in banc review. This resulted because
there was a vacancy on the nine-judge court and one of the eight active judges did not vote
because of disqualification. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Timbers criticized the result as "most
unfortunate in thwarting the clear intent of the rule." Id. at 1042. It was particularly undesirable
in Zahn, he continued, because the case involved "one of the more pressing issues of our day-an
issue to which the best thinking of legal scholars, lawyers and judges has been devoted." Id. For
a discussion of Zahn see notes 147-54 supra and accompanying text.
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
179. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 291
(1973) (Mansfield, J., concurring).
180. 480 F.2d 293, 305 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Timbers, J., dissenting).
181. In IBM the court granted in banc review but dismissed the appeal on the grounds that
the court lacked jurisdiction. In his dissent from the dismissal, Judge Timbers analyzed the "facts
of en banc life," id. at 303-05, and concluded: "The moral of the en banc procedure in this case
. . . is that it is of less importance that the vote of a single active judge could have blocked en
banc reconsideration than that each active judge was willing to vote in favor of en banc, thus
assuring that the will of the other four to reconsider the case en banc was not thwarted." Id. at
305 (emphasis deleted).
182. See, e.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 825 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1041-42
(2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers, J., dissenting), aff'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973).

1974]

IN BANC PROCEDURE

E. Extreme Diversity and Extraordinary Cases
As noted above, 183 the Second Circuit has denied in banc review on the
grounds that the case was of such extraordinary importance or created so
much diversity of opinion that only the Supreme Court could resolve the
issues. In other instances it has denied review because the majority of voting
judges believe the decision of the panel would be affirmed.' 84 Each of these
purported justifications for denying in banc consideration may act as a
disservice to the purposes of rule 35.
Judge Oakes, in his dissent to the denial of in banc review in Eisen 111, 1s
aptly criticized the majority's rationale that the case was of such exceptional
importance that only the most authoritative court should decide the issue:
"For this court not to hear a matter of this significance is to render the en
banc statute a nullity."' 8 6 His reasons are persuasive: the Supreme Court has
admonished the courts of appeals to hear cases in banc;18 7 without in banc
procedures, the burden on the Supreme Court would be greater than it
already is;' 8 8 it is presumptuous to think that the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari;' 8 9 if the Supreme Court should grant review, it would be valuable
for the Court to have before it a different view than the panel's;' 90 in banc
procedure or some substitute for it is necessary to "ensure cohesion, a degree
of uniformity and the promotion of appellate justice, in the Court of
Appeals,"' 19 none of which is accomplished when the court relies on the
contingency of Supreme Court review. 192 In short, he concluded, "[vle will at
least be somewhat unpredictable, and this may create enough litigation on the
chance that an individual panel may reverse that our calendar will become
19 as
unmanageable as the panel opinion felt the instant class action was."'
Denial of in banc review because of the belief that the panel decision will
be affirmed evades the question of whether the case presents issues of
substantial importance. If an issue is important, opportunity should be
afforded for airing divergent views. This is particularly true where one or
more of the judges who formed the panel majority favor in banc
proceedings. 194 In addition, a decision in banc on the merits, even if it merely
183.
184.

See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra.
E.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972). aff'd. 414 U S- 291

(1973); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert- denied, 407
U.S. 926 (1972).

185. 479 F.2d 1005, 1021 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
186. Id. at 1021 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
187. Id.at 1022, 1025.
188. Id.at 1025.
189. Id.at 1026.
190. Id.
191. Id.at 1025.
192. Id.at 1026.
193. Id.
194. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 494 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Timbers, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
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affirms the panel, has more precedential value than the panel decision and
thereby aids uniformity of justice. In short, it eliminates any chance of a
fortuitous composition of the panel and improves the palatability of the
decision. 195
F. Failure to Achieve Uniformity
Even when a court follows the Supreme Court mandate 196 to use in banc
review, the goal of uniformity may be thwarted. A lack of agreement in the in
banc proceeding may leave the issue as unresolved, or create greater
uncertainty. 197 Such a failure to establish a clear majority view leaves a judge
who disagrees an opportunity to interpret or distinguish subsequent cases in a
manner actually inconsistent with the majority view. 198
In order to give the desired effect to the in banc proceeding employed to
resolve intracircuit conflict, two factors must be present. First, the court must
develop opinions clearly expressing the opinion of the majority to be followed.
Second, the panels must follow the in banc precedents with even greater zeal
than prior panel decisions. 199
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although rule 35 has clarified the in banc procedure and provided some
uniformity throughout the circuits, serious problems remain both for litigants
and for the courts. While litigants remain frustrated by the impossibility of
predicting what cases will be deemed worthy of in banc consideration, the
courts find themselves torn between the institutional necessity for the procedure and its practical burdens. Despite increasing concern and discussion, it
seems inevitable that this balance, between necessity and burden, will continue to be struck on a circuit by circuit, case by case, basis.
It might be suggested that in order to facilitate a more predictable outcome
in granting or denying in banc consideration the judges look more to the
substance of the rule. When a case is exceptionally important or suggests a
conflict it should be heard in banc. Such ancillary issues as the time taken for
the determination, 20 0 the final outcome on the merits, 20 ' and the eventual

grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court should be ignored in considering the
20 2
case for in banc.

The requirement that the majority of active judges vote to in banc a case
195.
vacated
196.
197.
198.

See
and
See
See
Id.

199.

Id.

generally Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1020-26 (2d Cir. 1973),
remanded, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
note 187 supra and accompanying text.
Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities 583-85.

200. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d at 1020 (Kaufman, J., on petition for
in banc); id. at 1021 (Mansfield, J., concurring). But see id. at 1021 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
201. See Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d at 827 (Mansfield, J., replying to the
dissent). But see id. at 825 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
202. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d at 1021 (Oakes, J., dissenting); section V(E)
supra.
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should be changed to the majority of those judges voting.-203 It would seem to
be advisable that this rule be even further liberalized to allow a tie vote to
suffice for in banc consideration. It should be remembered that the vote on in
banc is not a vote on the merits but a vote on whether the issues are
sufficiently important or whether there is a conflict. It would seem that in a
case like Boraas where four of eight judges thought there was a conflict and
an issue of importance, in banc should be utilized to hear or rehear the issue
before the entire court. Furthermore, the circulation of panel opinions to the
other active judges of the court before publication might improve the
efficiency of the in banc procedure by allowing the case to be heard in banc
rather than reheard in banc.

20 4

It also seems to be an anomaly of the

procedure that although a case is taken in banc it is often on submission of the
papers without oral argument. It would appear that, if a case is of such
exceptional importance that it merits the consideration of the entire court, it
certainly merits the relatively short time it takes for oral argument.20 5
"While certainty in the law is a virtue, history discloses that resilience is
equally essential. ' 20 6 Similarly, in the courts of appeals, the desire for
certainty, and finality of decisions, should not prevent judges from being
"more gingerly about declining to act as a full court in ruling upon substantial
questions of unusual importance. ' 20 7 Nor should the virtues of flexibility
prevent reforms along the lines suggested above.

Peter Michael Madden
203. Report of the Judicial Conference, reprinted in 1973 Ann. Rep. 47. The Judicial
Conference has recommended proposed legislation to effect this change. Id.; see section V(D)
supra.
204. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d at 1021 (Oakes, J., dissenting); ,Marls 96;
section V(A) supra.
205. See section V(C) supra.
206. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 828 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J.,
concurring), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
207. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J., dissenting).

